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Abstract –Natural selection favors the more successful individuals. This is the elementary premise
that pervades common models of evolution. Under extreme conditions, however, the process
may no longer be probabilistic. Those that meet certain conditions survive and may reproduce
while others perish. By introducing the corresponding binary birth-death dynamics to spatial
evolutionary games, we observe solutions that are fundamentally different from those reported
previously based on imitation dynamics. Social dilemmas transform to collective enterprises,
where the availability of free expansion ranges and limited exploitation possibilities dictates self-
organized growth. Strategies that dominate are those that are collectively most apt in meeting
the survival threshold, rather than those who succeed in exploiting others for unfair benefits.
Revisiting Darwinian principles with the focus on survival rather than imitation thus reveals the
most counterintuitive ways of reconciling cooperation with competition.
In The Origin of Species, Darwin laid out a beautiful
theory according to which generations of organisms change
gradually over time to give rise to the astonishing diver-
sity of life we witness today. Only organisms that sur-
vive long enough to reproduce are able to pass on their
genetic material, and in time those characteristics that al-
low survival and reproduction become more common [1].
Individual fitness is key to success, as those who fail to
reproduce are destined to disappear through natural se-
lection. But if only the fittest survive, why is there so
much cooperation in nature? Eusocial insects like ants
and bees are famous for their large-scale cooperative be-
havior, even giving up their own reproductive potential
to support that of the queen [2]. Cooperative breeding in
birds prompts allomaternal behavior where helpers take
care for the offspring of others [3]. Microorganisms co-
operate with each other by sharing resources and joining
together to form biofilms [4]. Humans have recently been
dubbed supercooperators [5] for our unparalleled other-
regarding abilities and cooperative drive. But why should
an organism carry out an altruistic act that is costly to
perform, but benefits another? Altruistic cooperation is
the most important challenge to Darwin’s theory, and it
is fundamental for the understanding of the main evolu-
tionary transitions that led from single-cell organisms to
complex animal and human societies [6].
Hamilton’s kin selection theory has been applied pro-
lifically to solve the puzzle [7], resting on the fact that
by helping a close relative to reproduce still allows in-
direct passing of the genes to the next generation. But
since cooperation is common not only between relatives,
other mechanisms have also been identified, including var-
ious forms of reciprocity and group selection [8]. Network
reciprocity in particular [9], has recently attracted consid-
erable attention in the physics community, as it became
clear that methods of nonequilibrium statistical physics
[10–13] can inform relevantly on the outcome of evolution-
ary games on structured populations [14–20]. While the
basic idea behind network reciprocity is simple — coopera-
tors do better if they are surrounded by other cooperators
— the manifestation of this fact and the phase transi-
tions leading to it depend sensitively on the structure of
the interaction network and the type of interactions [14],
as well as on the number and type of competing strate-
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Fig. 1: Stationary frequency of cooperators (blue wire) and empty sites (gray wire) on the T − S parameter plane for Q = 2
(left) and Q = 1.5 (right). The square lattice (L = 400) with nearest-neighbor interaction range (R1) was used, and initially
cooperators, defectors and empty sites were distributed uniformly at random in the whole lattice. Dashed lines delineate the
four different types of social games.
gies [21]. Physics-inspired studies have led to significant
advances in our understanding of the evolution of coop-
eration, for example by revealing the importance of time
scales in evolutionary dynamics [22], the positive impact
of heterogeneity of interaction networks [23], the dynam-
ical organization of cooperation [24] in conjunction with
population growth [25, 26], as well as the emergence of
hierarchy among competing individuals [27].
While the infusion of physics is a relatively recent de-
velopment, evolutionary game theory [28–30] is long es-
tablished as the theory of choice for studying the evolu-
tion of cooperation among selfish individuals. Competing
strategies vie for survival and reproduction through the
maximization of their utilities, which are traditionally as-
sumed to be payoffs that are determined by the definition
of the contested game. The most common assumption un-
derlying the evolution on structured populations has been
that the more successful strategies are imitated and thus
spread based on their success in accruing the highest pay-
offs [14–16]. As such, imitation has been considered as
the main driving force of evolution, reflecting the individ-
ual struggles for success and the pressure of natural selec-
tion. In harsh environments, like bacterial colonies during
growth [31], however, imitation may be prohibitively slow,
and the extreme conditions may render a strategy viable
or not in a binary way. Either the conditions for survival
by an individual are met and may lead to offspring, or
they are not and the individual perishes. Here we explore
the consequences of such a binary birth-death evolution-
ary dynamics on structured populations, which effectively
shifts the focus of Darwinian selection from the imitation
of the fittest to the survival of the viable.
We study pairwise evolutionary games on a square lat-
tice of size L2, where mutual cooperation yields the reward
R, mutual defection leads to punishment P , and the mixed
choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the
defector the temptation T . Within this setup we have the
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game if T > R > P > S, the
snowdrift game (SD) if T > R > S > P , and the stag-
hunt (SH) game if R > T > P > S, thus covering all three
major social dilemma types. Without loss of generality we
set R = 1, P = 0, 0 ≤ T ≤ 2, and −1 ≤ S ≤ 1, as illus-
trated in Fig. 1. We note that T < 1 and S > 0 quadrant
marks the harmony game (HG), which however does not
constitute a social dilemma. Initially, either the whole or
part of the lattice is populated by cooperators (C) and de-
fectors (D), who are distributed randomly amidst empty
sites (E), all in equal proportion. We conduct Monte Carlo
simulations by randomly selecting a player x from the pop-
ulation, who acquires its accumulated payoff Πx by play-
ing the game with its four nearest neighbors. We refer to
the latter as the R1 interaction range, but we also con-
sider n−level interactions (Rn) that encompass all players
whose distance in taxicab metric is smaller than n lattice
constants from the focal player. Practically, it means that
for R2 a focal player interacts with 12 players and for R3
it interacts with 24 players. As the key parameter we in-
troduce the survival threshold Q, which characterizes the
necessary demand of the environment. If Πx ≥ Q player
x is allowed to place an offspring on a randomly chosen
empty site within its interaction range (in the absence of
an empty site player x survives but does not place an off-
spring). If Πx < Q player x dies out, leaving behind an
empty site. Each full Monte Carlo step gives a chance to
every player to either reproduce (survive in the absence of
space) or die once on average.
Three qualitatively different scenarios exist depending
on Q. If Q > Πx even for the most individually favor-
able strategy configurations (for example a defector being
surrounded solely by cooperators in the PD game), the en-
tire population dies out. If Q is very low, both strategies
are viable and essential spread randomly as determined
by the toss of a coin. For intermediate values of Q, how-
ever, fascinating evolutionary outcomes emerge. Figure 1
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Fig. 2: Stationary frequency of cooperators ρC in dependence
on the threshold value Q for two representative T − S pairs.
Panel (a) shows the result for the prisoner’s dilemma game
obtained by using T = 1.5 and S = −0.5, while panel (b) shows
the result for the snowdrift game obtained by using T = 1.5
and S = 0.5. Regardless of game parametrization, there exists
an intermediate interval of Q values within which cooperation
thrives best. We have used the R2 interaction range on a square
lattice with linear size L = 3200 and random initial conditions.
The displayed results are averages over 100 independent runs.
summarizes the possibilities on the T − S plane for two
different values of Q. For Q = 2 (left) cooperators domi-
nate across the PD and SH quadrant since the threshold is
high enough to support only cooperative behavior. Defec-
tors are able to prevail mostly in the SD quadrant, where
they benefit from the game parametrization that awards
cumulatively highest payoffs to mixed C + D pairs. If
the threshold is lowered to Q = 1.5, defectors are able
to survive in the presence of cooperators even if S < 0.
Counterintuitively, increasing the value of S can support
defectors before the transition to the SD quadrant. This
is akin to the phenomenon observed in games of cyclic
dominance, where the direct support of prey will often
strengthen predators [32,33]. In our case, if the threshold
is not too high, cooperators (prey) can survive even if they
are exploited by defectors (predators). Increasing S sup-
ports cooperators, but if they are surrounded by defectors
the latter are supported even more since they can continue
with their exploitation. Thus, relatively low Q can sustain
a mixed state even if the overall productivity of the pop-
ulation is marginal. It is important to note that these
results are in stark contrast with the outcome obtained if
the evolutionary process is governed by strategy imitation
or other proportional rules where the more successful indi-
viduals produce offspring with higher probability (see e.g.
[15]).
To illustrate the dependence on Q explicitly, we show in
Fig. 2 the stationary frequency of cooperators ρC for the
prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game at R2. The
wider interaction range as used in Fig. 1 allows us to ob-
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Fig. 3: Evolution of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) from
an initially fully (a-d) and partially (e-h) populated square lat-
tice with R1. Although the distribution of strategies and empty
sites (white) is the same within the populated area, the final
outcome is significantly different. Defectors need the presence
of cooperators to survive (b,d), and they stifle proliferation of
cooperative behavior in the absence of free expansion ranges
(d). If the latter exist (e), cooperators spread successfully (f,g),
and their compact domains are not penetrable by defectors (h).
Parameter values are L = 200, T = 1.5, S = −0.2, and Q = 1.5.
Snapshots were taken after 50, 100, and 200 MCS.
serve a broader range of the Q dependence, because the
maximally attainable payoff of the players is accordingly
larger. Regardless of this, however, the main features of
the outlined threshold dependence are robust and obvi-
ously independent of the applied interaction range. It can
be observed that there exists an optimal intermediate in-
terval of Q values, for which the level of cooperation in
the population is maximal. Interestingly, and in agree-
ment with our previous observations related to the results
presented in Fig. 1, harsh external conditions that are con-
stituted by the prisoner’s dilemma confer a stronger evo-
lutionary advantage to the cooperators.
Snapshots presented in Fig. 3 reveal fundamental dif-
ferences in the way cooperators and defectors spread if
compared to imitation-based dynamics. In the latter case,
cooperators form compact clusters to protect themselves
against the exploitation by defectors (see e.g. [9]). Binary
birth-death dynamics also introduces clusters of cooper-
ators (c,d), which allow defectors who manage to cling
onto one of the interfaces to earn sufficiently high payoffs.
Those defectors that fail to do so die out. This fact is il-
lustrated clearly in the bottom row, where an initial state
with ample expansion range (e) allows cooperators to free
themselves from defectors (f) and expand unboundedly in
a self-organized way (g,h). Defectors remain frozen within
their initial radius of existence and cannot spread further.
The random initial state depicted in (a), which was also
used for producing Fig. 1, is thus not necessarily the most
compatible with birth-death dynamics, as it may fail to
reveal the entire potential of cooperative behavior. If a
smaller portion of the lattice is used like in (e), then the
final outcome will in fact always be a cooperator-dominant
state, regardless of the values of Q (assuming of course Q
p-3
Szolnoki et al.
i j k l
e f g h
a b c d
Fig. 4: Increasing the interaction range from R1 (see Fig. 3)
to R4 (four times the elementary nearest-neighbor range) in-
creases the vulnerability of cooperators. In the absence of free
expansion ranges (a) defective behavior thrives (b), but as soon
as cooperators vanish defectors alone are unable to reach the
survival threshold Q and die out (c,d). If free expansion ranges
do exist (e), chances are that some cooperators can evade the
exploitation and spread in a given direction (f). However, de-
fectors that succeed in maintaining contact to cooperators form
a persistent front, the width of which cannot exceed the inter-
action range (g,h). Evolutionary stability is determined by
the curvature of the invasion front, which leads to symmetry
breaking in favor of defection if it is positive (i-l) (see Fig. 5).
Parameter values are L = 200, T = 2, S = −1, and Q = 29
(the higher threshold is possible due to the larger interaction
range).
is within reach of a cooperative domain), T and S. Here a
destructive strategy like defection cannot expand towards
the empty space, but can only exploit other cooperators
locally to ensure its own mere existence.
Further supporting these conclusions are snapshots pre-
sented in Fig. 4, where the larger R4 interaction range
allows defectors to exploit cooperators more efficiently. In
the absence of free expansion ranges (a) defectors initially
thrive (b), but subsequently fall victim to the absence of
cooperators and die out (c,d). This is a vivid demonstra-
tion of an actual tragedy of the commons [34]. Initial con-
ditions in (e) yield a very different evolutionary outcome.
Although the majority of the population within the circle
dies out, some cooperators at the edge nevertheless suc-
ceed in forming a homogeneous domain and reaching Q
(f). They spread towards the empty space, but defectors
form a persistent front that never vanishes (g,h). It turns
out that the curvature of this front is crucial for cooper-
ators to survive. If the curvature is positive (i), symme-
try breaking favors defection and the whole population is
again destined to die out — as soon as cooperators vanish,
defectors are soon to follow, as illustrated in (c,d).
Details of the symmetry breaking are explained in
xy
Fig. 5: Schematic explanation of symmetry breaking of domain
wall movement that preserves the constant width of invasion
fronts of defectors depicted in Fig. 4. Cooperators (blue) that
are unable to reach Q and defectors (red) that are unable to
reach Q if a cooperator dies out are encircled (left). When
cooperator x dies, the empty site can be populated by an off-
spring from any cooperator that is within the interaction range
(dashed circle in the middle panel). But since the interface
has a positive curvature from the point of view of cooperators,
there are even more defectors to place an offspring on x. Due
to the symmetry breaking it is more likely that the site x will
be populated by a defector. As soon as this happens, however,
a defector at the edge of the interface will die out (site y). And
in this way, all the encircled cooperators in the left panel will
be replaced by a defector, while all the encircled defectors will
die out. At the same time, cooperators will spread further to-
wards the empty space (right). Thus, the domains move and
are stable, but the width of the defective front remains con-
stant.
Fig. 5. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of cooperators
the interface is stable if it is either straight or has neg-
ative curvature. The defector’s point of view is slightly
different because T > R breaks the symmetry, and a de-
fector can thus reach Q even if the curvature is positive.
As panels (g,h) of Fig. 4 demonstrate, straight and nega-
tive defective fronts indeed fail to upset cooperators, while
a belt of defectors can easily suffocate a cooperative do-
main [compare panels (i) and (l) in Fig. 4]. We note that
the curvature-dependent propagation of the C −D inter-
face is more robust at larger interaction range (R3 or R4)
because the width of the defective front at R1 or R2 is
very narrow and may thus break apart easily.
Having revealed the mechanisms that may sustain the
dominance of cooperators even in the most adverse so-
cial dilemma (T = 2, S = −1), it remains of interest
to study the evolutionary dynamics in the SD quadrant.
Snapshots presented in Fig. 6 demonstrate self-organized
growth towards the globally optimal mixed C +D state.
It is worth noting that a similar “role-separating” distri-
bution of strategies could be the result of evolution when
other-regarding preferences are introduced among players
[35]. While a random mixture of cooperators and defectors
is unable to survive (b), especially not at R4 (f), once the
role-separation sets in, the mixed clusters with proper dis-
tribution of strategies expand until the whole population
is occupied (c,d and g,h). Although the applied binary
birth-death dynamics affects exclusively individual play-
ers, a sufficiently high threshold value Q spontaneously
selects the global optimum through self-organization.
Summarizing, we have shown that replacing imitation
p-4
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Fig. 6: If the prisoner’s dilemma is replaced by the snowdrift
game, cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) have the potential
to spread independently. But since the mixed C + D pairing
yields the highest cumulative payoff above the T + S = 2 line,
a sufficiently high threshold value Q can evoke the optimal
solution. As panels (a-d) illustrate, the role separation emerges
spontaneously from a random initial state, and although the
birth-death rule acts locally, the stationary state is globally
optimal. This emergence is clearer still if the R1 interaction
range (a-d) is replaced by the R4 interaction range (e-g), and
if initially the population is bounded to a small fraction of the
whole lattice (e). While a random mixture of strategies fails to
preclude extinction (f), spontaneously emerging compact C +
D clusters grow unbounded. This is a self-organizing growth.
Defectors are unable to survive alone — they need cooperators
to utilize on the high value of T — but the relatively high
value of S sustains cooperators as well. Parameter values are
L = 200, T = 2, S = 1, and Q = 3 (a-d) 29 (e-h). The systems
reached the final state after 500 MCS.
with a binary birth-death rule in spatial evolutionary
games creates a new class of solutions of social dilem-
mas. If free expansion ranges are paired with limited
exploitation possibilities, cooperative behavior dominates
the prisoner’s dilemma and the stag-hunt game by means
of unbounded self-organized expansion that sets in as soon
as cooperators find a niche to expand. If defectors are
given the opportunity to exploit cooperators more effec-
tively through the application of larger interaction ranges,
cooperative behavior may still thrive, although it relies on
a special type of symmetry breaking that determines the
direction of invasion based on the curvature of the inter-
face that separates the two competing strategies. Coun-
terintuitively, higher levels of cooperation are observed in
the prisoner’s dilemma than in the snowdrift quadrant,
since in the latter case self-organized growth favors mixed
C + D domains with proper role separation. Regardless
of the governing social dilemma, and despite of the fact
that the birth-death dynamics acts locally, the stationary
state is always globally optimal in that the payoff of the
entire population is maximal. We note that all the pre-
sented results are robust to variations of the interaction
network, and can be observed also in off-lattice simula-
tions [36], thus indicating a high degree of universality.
Yet the studied model also invites a more sophisticated
introduction of separate thresholds for births and deaths
to be studied in the future, although we expect that this
will not influence the fundamental positive role of the re-
ported self-organized growth. Another promising avenue
to explore in the future could be the combination of imita-
tion and binary birth-death rules, which might give rise to
further fascinating evolutionary outcomes that are driven
by pattern formation.
Our results also highlight the importance of initial con-
ditions, in particular the fact that a random initial state
without obvious chances of expansion may fail to reveal
all the benefits of cooperative behavior. This may be rel-
evant in experimental setups. Recent experiments with
microbial metapopulations indeed support the conclusion
that range expansion may promote cooperation [37]. Al-
though special initial conditions with ample empty space
may appear somewhat artificial in the realm of mathemat-
ical modeling, they do mimic rather accurately the condi-
tions in a Petri dish [38,39], and together with birth-death
dynamics they appear to hold the key for understanding
the success of cooperation from an entirely different per-
spective.
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